Computers are special technology and they raise some special ethical
issues. In this essay I will discuss what makes computers different from
other technology and how this difference makes a difference in ethical
considerations. In particular, I want to characterize computer ethics and
show why this emerging field is both intellectually interesting and enormously
important.
On my view, computer ethics is the analysis of the nature and social
impact of computer technology and the corresponding formulation and justification
of policies for the ethical use of such technology. I use the phrase “computer
technology” because I take the subject matter of the field broadly to include
computers and associated technology. For instance, I include concerns about
software as well as hardware and concerns about networks connecting computers
as well as computers themselves.
A typical problem in computer ethics arises because there is a policy
vacuum about how computer technology should be used. Computers provide
us with new capabilities and these in turn give us new choices for action.
Often, either no policies for conduct in these situations exist or existing
policies seem inadequate. A central task of computer ethics is to determine
what we should do in such cases, i.e., to formulate policies to guide our
actions. Of course, some ethical situations confront us as individuals
and some as a society. Computer ethics includes consideration of both personal
and social policies for the ethical use of computer technology.
Now it may seem that all that needs to be done is the mechanical application
of an ethical theory to generate the appropriate policy. But this is usually
not possible. A difficulty is that along with a policy vacuum there is
often a conceptual vacuum. Although a problem in computer ethics may seem
clear initially, a little reflection reveals a conceptual muddle. What
is needed in such cases is an analysis which provides a coherent conceptual
framework within which to formulate a policy for action. Indeed, much of
the important work in computer ethics is devoted to proposing conceptual
frameworks for understanding ethical problems involving computer technology.
An example may help to clarify the kind of conceptual work that is
required. Let’s suppose we are trying to formulate a policy for protecting
computer programs. Initially, the idea may seem clear enough. We are looking
for a policy for protecting a kind of intellectual property. But then a
number of questions which do not have obvious answers emerge. What is a
computer program? Is it really intellectual property which can be owned
or is it more like an idea, an algorithm, which is not owned by anybody?
If a computer program is intellectual property, is it an expression of
an idea that is owned (traditionally protectable by copyright) or is it
a process that is owned (traditionally protectable by patent)? Is a machine-readable
program a copy of a human-readable program? Clearly, we need a conceptualization
of the nature of a computer program in order to answer these kinds of questions.
Moreover, these questions must be answered in order to formulate a useful
policy for protecting computer programs. Notice that the conceptualization
we pick will not only affect how a policy will be applied but to a certain
extent what the facts are. For instance, in this case the conceptualization
will determine when programs count as instances of the same program.
Even within a coherent conceptual framework, the formulation of a policy
for using computer technology can be difficult. As we consider different
policies we discover something about what we value and what we don’t. Because
computer technology provides us with new possibilities for acting, new
values emerge. For example, creating software has value in our culture
which it didn’t have a few decades ago. And old values have to be reconsidered.
For instance, assuming software is intellectual property, why should intellectual
property be protected? In general, the consideration of alternative policies
forces us to discover and make explicit what our value preferences are.
The mark of a basic problem in computer ethics is one in which computer technology is essentially involved and there is an uncertainty about what to do and even about how to understand the situation. Hence, not all ethical situations involving computers are central to computer ethics. If a burglar steals available office equipment including computers, then the burglar has done something legally and ethically wrong. But this is really an issue for general law and ethics. Computers are only accidently involved in this situation, and there is no policy or conceptual vacuum to fill. The situation and the applicable policy are clear.
In one sense I am arguing for the special status of computer ethics as a field of study. Applied ethics is not simply ethics applied. But, I also wish to stress the underlying importance of general ethics and science to computer ethics. Ethical theory provides categories and procedures for determining what is ethically relevant. For example, what kinds of things are good? What are our basic rights? What is an impartial point of view? These considerations are essential in comparing and justifying policies for ethical conduct. Similarly, scientific information is crucial in ethical evaluations. It is amazing how many times ethical disputes turn not on disagreements about values but on disagreements about facts.
On my view, computer ethics is a dynamic and complex field of study which considers the relationships among facts, conceptualizations, policies and values with regard to constantly changing computer technology. Computer ethics is not a fixed set of rules which one shellacs and hangs on the wall. Nor is computer ethics the rote application of ethical principles to a value-free technology. Computer ethics requires us to think anew about the nature of computer technology and our values. Although computer ethics is a field between science and ethics and depends on them, it is also a discipline in its own right which provides both conceptualizations for understanding and policies for using computer technology.
Though I have indicated some of the intellectually interesting features
of computer ethics, I have not said much about the problems of the field
or about its practical importance. The only example I have used so far
is the issue of protecting computer programs which may seem to be a very
narrow concern. In fact, I believe the domain of computer ethics is quite
large and extends to issues which affect all of us. Now I want to turn
to a consideration of these issues and argue for the practical importance
of computer ethics. I will proceed not by giving a list of problems but
rather by analyzing the conditions and forces which generate ethical issues
about computer technology. In particular, I want to analyze what is special
about computers, what social impact computers will have, and what is operationally
suspect about computing technology. I hope to show some-thing of the nature
of computer ethics by doing some computer ethics.
What is special about computers? It is often said that a Computer Revolution
is taking place, but what is it about computers that makes them revolutionary?
One difficulty in assessing the revolutionary nature of computers is that
the word “revolutionary” has been devalued. Even minor technological improvements
are heralded as revolutionary. A manu-facturer of a new dripless pouring
spout may well promote it as revolu-tionary. If minor technological improvements
are revolutionary, then undoubtedly everchanging computer technology is
revolutionary. The interesting issue, of course, is whether there is some
nontrivial sense in which computers are revolutionary. What makes computer
technology importantly different from other technology? Is there any real
basis for comparing the Computer Revolution with the
Industrial Revolution?
If we look around for features that make computers revolutionary, several
features suggest themselves. For example, in our society computers are
affordable and abundant. It is not much of an exaggeration to say that
currently in our society every major business, factory, school, bank, and
hospital is rushing to utilize computer technology. Millions of personal
computers are being sold for home use. Moreover, computers are integral
parts of products which don’t look much like computers such as watches
and automobiles. Computers are abundant and inexpensive, but so are pencils.
Mere abundance and affordability don’t seem sufficient to justify any claim
to technological revolution.
One might claim the newness of computers makes them revolu-tionary.
Such a thesis requires qualification. Electronic digital computers have
been around for forty years. In fact, if the abacus counts as a computer,
then computer technology is among the oldest technologies. A better way
to state this claim is that recent engineering advances in computers make
them revolutionary. Obviously, computers have been immensely improved over
the last forty years. Along with dramatic increases in computer speed and
memory there have been dramatic decreases in computer size. Computer manufacturers
are quick to point out that desk top computers today exceed the engineering
specifications of computers which filled rooms only a few decades ago.
There has been also a determined effort by companies to make computer hardware
and computer software easier to use. Computers may not be completely user
friendly but at least they are much less unfriendly. However, as important
as these features are, they don’t seem to get to the heart of the Computer
Revolution. Small, fast, powerful and easy-to-use electric can openers
are great improvements over earlier can openers, but they aren’t in the
relevant sense revolutionary.
Of course, it is important that computers are abundant, less expensive,
smaller, faster, and more powerful and friendly. But, these features serve
as enabling conditions for the spread of the Computer Revolution. The essence
of the Computer Revolution is found in the nature of a computer itself.
What is revolutionary about computers is logical malleability. Computers
are logically malleable in that they can be shaped and molded to do any
activity that can be characterized in terms of inputs, outputs, and connecting
logical operations. Logical operations are the precisely defined steps
which take a computer from one state to the next. The logic of computers
can be massaged and shaped in endless ways through changes in hardware
and software. Just as the power of a steam engine was a raw resource of
the Industrial Revolution so the logic of a computer is a raw resource
of the Computer Revolution. Because logic applies everywhere, the potential
applications of computer technology appear limitless. The computer is the
nearest thing we have to a universal tool. Indeed, the limits of computers
are largely the limits of our own creativity. The driving question of the
Computer Revolution is “How can we mold the logic of computers to better
serve our purposes?”
I think logical malleability explains the already widespread application
of computers and hints at the enormous impact computers are destined to
have. Understanding the logical malleability of computers is essential
to understanding the power of the developing technological revolution.
Understanding logical malleability is also important in setting policies
for the use of computers. Other ways of conceiving computers serve less
well as a basis for formulating and justifying policies for action.
Consider an alternative and popular conception of computers in which
computers are understood as number crunchers, i.e., essentially as numerical
devices. On this conception computers are nothing but big calculators.
It might be maintained on this view that mathematical and scientific applications
should take precedence over nonnumerical applications such as word processing.
My position, on the contrary, is that computers are logically malleable.
The arithmetic interpretation is certainly a correct one, but it is only
one among many interpretations. Logical malleability has both a syntactic
and a semantic dimension. Syntactically, the logic of computers is malleable
in terms of the number and variety of possible states and operations. Semantically,
the logic of computers is malleable in that the states of the computer
can be taken to represent anything. Computers manipulate symbols but they
don’t care what the symbols represent. Thus, there is no ontological basis
for giving preference to numerical applications over nonnumerical applications.
The fact that computers can be described in mathematical language, even
at a very low level, doesn’t make them essentially numerical. For example,
machine language is conveniently and traditionally expressed in 0’s and
l’s. But the 0’s and l’s simply designate different physical states. We
could label these states as “on” and “off” or “yin” and “yang” and apply
binary logic. Obviously, at some levels it is useful to use mathematical
notation to describe computer operations, and it is reasonable to use it.
The mistake is to reify the mathematical notation as the essence of a computer
and then use this conception to make judgments about the appropriate use
of computers.
In general, our conceptions of computer technology will affect our
policies for using it. I believe the importance of properly conceiving
the nature and impact of computer technology will increase as the Computer
Revolution unfolds.
What I mean by “transformed” is that the basic nature or purpose of
an activity or institution is changed. This is marked by the kinds of questions
that are asked. During the introduction stage computers are understood
as tools for doing standard jobs. A typical question for this stage is
“How well does a computer do such and such an activity?” Later, during
the permea-tion stage, computers become an integral part of the activity.
A typical question for this stage is “What is the nature and value of such
and such an activity?” In our society there is already some evidence of
the transforming effect of computerization as marked by the kind of questions
being asked.
For example, for years computers have been used to count votes. Now
the election process is becoming highly computerized. Computers can be
used to count votes and to make projections about the outcome. Television
networks use computers both to determine quickly who is winning and to
display the results in a technologically impressive manner. During the
last presidential election in the United States [1984] the television networks
projected the results not only before the polls in California were closed
but also before the polls in New York were closed. In fact, voting was
still going on in over half the states when the winner was announced. The
question is no longer “How efficiently do computers count votes in a fair
election?” but “What is a fair election?” Is it appropriate that some people
know the outcome before they vote? The problem is that computers not only
tabulate the votes for each candidate but likely influence the number and
distribution of these votes. For better or worse, our electoral process
is being transformed.
As computers permeate more and more of our society, I think we will
see more and more of the transforming effect of computers on our basic
institutions and practices. Nobody can know for sure how our computerized
society will look fifty years from now, but it is reasonable to think that
various aspects of our daily work will be transformed. Computers have been
used for years by businesses to expedite routine work, such as calculating
payrolls; but as personal computers become widespread and allow executives
to work at home, and as robots do more and more factory work, the emerging
question will be not merely “How well do computers help us work?” but “What
is the nature of this work?”
Traditional work may no longer be defined as something that normally happens at a specific time or a specific place. Work for us may become less doing a job than instructing a computer to do a job. As the concept of work begins to change, the values associated with the old concept will have to be reexamined. Executives who work at a computer terminal at home will lose some spontaneous interaction with colleagues. Factory workers who direct robots by pressing buttons may take less pride in a finished product. And similar effects can be expected in other types of work. Commercial pilots who watch computers fly their planes may find their jobs to be different from what they expected.
A further example of the transforming effect of computer technology
is found in financial institutions. As the transfer and storage of funds
becomes increasingly computerized the question will be not merely “How
well do computers count money?” but “What is money?” For instance, in a
cashless society in which debits are made to one’s account electronically
at the point of sale, has money disappeared in favor of computer records
or have electronic impulses become money? What opportunities and values
are lost or gained when money becomes intangible?
Still another likely area for the transforming effect of computers
is education. Currently, educational packages for computers are rather
limited. Now it is quite proper to ask “How well do computers educate?”
But as teachers and students exchange more and more information indirectly
via computer networks and as computers take over more routine instructional
activities, the question will inevitably switch to “What is education?”
The values associated with the traditional way of educating will be challenged.
How much human contact is necessary or desirable for learning? What is
education when computers do the teaching?
The point of this futuristic discussion is to suggest the likely impact
of computer technology. Though I don’t know what the details will be, I
believe the kind of transformation I am suggesting is likely to occur.
This is all I need to support my argument for the practical importance
of computer ethics. In brief, the argument is as follows: The revolutionary
feature of computers is their logical malleability. Logical malleability
assures the enormous application of computer technology. This will bring
about the Computer Revolution. During the Computer Revolution many of our
human activities and social institutions will be transformed. These transformations
will leave us with policy and conceptual vacuums about how to use computer
technology. Such policy and conceptual vacuums are the marks of basic problems
within computer ethics. Therefore, computer ethics is a field of substantial
practical importance.
I find this argument for the practical value of computer ethics convincing.
I think it shows that computer ethics is likely to have increasing application
in our society. This argument does rest on a vision of the Computer Revolution
which not everyone may share. Therefore, I will turn to another argument
for the practical importance of computer ethics which doesn’t depend upon
any particular view of the Computer Revolution. This argument rests on
the invisibility factor and suggests a number of ethical issues confronting
computer ethics now.
Another possibility for invisible abuse is the invasion of the property
and privacy of others. A computer can be programmed to contact another
computer over phone lines and surreptitiously remove or alter confidential
information. Sometimes an inexpensive computer and a telephone hookup is
all it takes. A group of teenagers, who named themselves “the 414s” after
the Milwaukee telephone exchange, used their home computers to invade a
New York hospital, a California bank, and a government nuclear weapons
laboratory. These break-ins were done as pranks, but obviously such invasions
can be done with malice and be difficult or impossible to detect.
A particularly insidious example of invisible abuse is the use of computers
for surveillance. For instance, a company’s central computer can monitor
the work done on computer terminals far better and more discreetly than
the most dedicated sweatshop manager. Also, computers can be programmed
to monitor phone calls and electronic mail without giving any evidence
of tampering. A Texas oil company, for example, was baffled why it was
always outbid on leasing rights for Alaskan territory until it discovered
another bidder was tapping its data transmission lines near its Alaskan
computer terminal.
A second variety of the invisibility factor, which is more subtle and
conceptually interesting than the first, is the presence of invisible programming
values. Invisible programming values are those values which are embedded
in a computer program.
Writing a computer program is like building a house. No matter how
detailed the specifications may be, a builder must make numerous decisions
about matters not specified in order to construct the house. Different
houses are compatible with a given set of specifications. Similarly, a
request for a computer program is made at a level of abstraction usually
far removed from the details of the actual programming language. In order
to implement a program which satisfies the specifications a programmer
makes some value judgments about what is important and what is not. These
values become embedded in the final product and may be invisible to someone
who runs the program.
Consider, for example, computerized airline reservations. Many different
programs could be written to produce a reservation service. American Airlines
once promoted such a service called “SABRE.” This program had a bias for
American Airline flights built in so that sometimes an American Airline
flight was suggested by the computer even if it was not the best flight
available. Indeed, Braniff Airlines, which went into bankruptcy for awhile,
sued American Airlines on the grounds that this kind of bias in the reservation
service contributed to its financial difficulties.
Although the general use of a biased reservation service is ethically
suspicious, a programmer of such a service may or may not be engaged in
invisible abuse. There may be a difference between how a programmer intends
a program to be used and how it is actually used. Moreover, even if one
sets out to create a program for a completely unbiased reservation service,
some value judgments are latent in the program because some choices have
to be made about how the program operates. Are airlines listed in alphabetical
order? Is more than one listed at a time? Are flights just before the time
requested listed? For what period after the time requested are flights
listed? Some answers, at least implicitly, have to be given to these questions
when the program is written. Whatever answers are chosen will build certain
values into the program.
Sometimes invisible programming values are so invisible that even the
programmers are unaware of them. Programs may have bugs or may be based
on implicit assumptions which don’t become obvious until there is a crisis.
For example, the operators of the ill-fated Three Mile Island nuclear power
plant were trained on a computer which was programmed to simulate possible
malfunctions including malfunctions which were dependent on other malfunctions.
But, as the Kemeny Commission which investigated the disaster discovered,
the simulator was not programmed to generate simultaneous, independent
malfunctions. In the actual failure at Three Mile Island the operators
were faced with exactly this situation simultaneous, independent malfunctions.
The inadequacy of the computer simulation was the result of a programming
decision, as unconscious or implicit as that decision may have been. Shortly
after the disaster the computer was reprogrammed to simulate situations
like the one that did occur at Three Mile Island.
A third variety of the invisibility factor, which is perhaps the most disturbing, is invisible complex calculation. Computers today are capable of enormous calculations beyond human comprehension. Even if a program is understood, it does not follow that the calculations based on that program are understood. Computers today perform, and certainly supercomputers in the future will perform, calculations which are too complex for human inspection and understanding.
An interesting example of such complex calculation occurred in 1976
when a computer worked on the four color conjecture. The four color problem,
a puzzle mathematicians have worked on for over a century is to show that
a map can be colored with at most four colors so that no adjacent areas
have the same color. Mathematicians at the University of Illinois broke
the problem down into thousands of cases and programmed computers to consider
them. After more than a thousand hours of computer time on various computers,
the four color conjecture was proved correct. What is interesting about
this mathematical proof, compared to traditional proofs, is that it is
largely invisible. The general structure of the proof is known and found
in the program and any particular part of the computer’s activity can be
examined, but practically speaking the calculations are too enormous for
humans to examine them all.
The issue is how much we should trust a computer’s invisible calculations.
This becomes a significant ethical issue as the consequences grow in importance.
For instance, computers are used by the military in making decisions about
launching nuclear weapons. On the one hand, computers are fallible and
there may not be time to confirm their assessment of the situation. On
the other hand, making decisions about launching nuclear weapons without
using computers may be even more fallible and more dangerous. What should
be our policy about trusting invisible calculations?
A partial solution to the invisibility problem may lie with computers
themselves. One of the strengths of computers is the ability to locate
hidden information and display it. Computers can make the invisible visible.
Information which is lost in a sea of data can be clearly revealed with
the proper computer analysis. But, that’s the catch. We don’t always know
when, where, and how to direct the computer’s attention. The invisibility
factor presents us with a dilemma. We are happy in one sense that the operations
of a computer are invisible. We don’t want to inspect every computerized
transaction or program every step for ourselves or watch every computer
calculation. In terms of efficiency the invisibility factor is a blessing.
But it is just this invisibility that makes us vulnerable. We are open
to invisible abuse or invisible programming of inappropriate values or
invisible miscalculation. The challenge for computer ethics is to formulate
policies which will help us deal with this dilemma. We must decide when
to trust computers and when not to trust them. This is another reason why
computer ethics is so important.
Dartmouth College